Salt Lake City v. Peggy Allred, aka Peggy Lovejoy, aka Thelma Allred : Brief In Support of Petition by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1967
Salt Lake City v. Peggy Allred, aka Peggy Lovejoy,
aka Thelma Allred : Brief In Support of Petition
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Hatch & McRae; Attorneys for Appellant
This Response to Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Response to Petition for Rehearing, Salt Lake City v. Allred, No. 10752 (1967).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3914
4 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
~ALT LAKE CTTY, a mnnicipal ~ 
corpora ti on, 
Plaintiff a11d Respondrnt, 
v. 
PEGGY ALLRED, aka PEGGY 
LOYE.TOY, aka THELMA ALLRED, 




BRIEF T~ ~FPPOR'l' OF P~~'l1ITIOX 
rrhis matter was heard on aprwal and on Jul>' 17, l9G/, 
a thne to two cl<•eision \Yas fi1Pd hy tl1<> Co mt . .T nstice 
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Ellett and Chief .Jnstict> Croek<.~tt filing writtt>n dis:-;('nts, 
with .Jnstict~ Ell(•tt basing 11is dissPnt on lll-S-41, lTtah 
CodP AnnotatPd 1953, and Chief .J irnticP Crockdt not 
l'Pfe1Ting to the pre-emption prohlem bnt speaking onl>' 
of lack of certainty and Jll"Psmuption of validity of h-'gis-
lation, citing a1' authorit>· "rn>· <'OlH'UITing opinion in 
.lonPs v. Logan City, 19 Utah 2d ·-------··--· 428 P. 2d HiO, 
and autl10ritil'S therPin cih•<l." Both tlll' rtah and Pacific 
('itations show that opinion to hl' a dissPnt and not a 
('Oncnrrmg opm1on. 
11he City fi!Pd and st'rn<l a tirnPly petition for rP-
hearing which was acted on ex parte by the Supreme 
( 'ourt, without opportunity for the a1)pellant to answer, 
as pro,~idPd hy 76(P) (2) and un. The mattPr was set 
for rehearing on SPpternhPr 11, 19G7. Fpon appearance 
of connsel for argument, District Judge Cowley was sit-
ting in place of Justice Callister for all cases set for that 
date. The Chief Justice statPd, "Jnstice Callister is out 
of tlw state. J ndgP Cowlt>y will sit in his place today." 
'[
1he mattPr was heard on SeptPmber 11, 1967. 
Counse 1 wrnte a letter to tlw flu1irPrne Court, attPn-
tion .Jnstic<' Crockett, citing Cord1wr 1'. Cord11er, supra, 
and othPr cases relative to the JwrsonnPl of tlw Conrt on 
r<'hearing. 
On Fehruary 9, 19G8, a new decision was filed, again 
a threP-two decision, with thP former dissenters concur-
ring with the Disfrict ,Judp;<> who authon•d the new major-
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ity 01)Jl11on, .Justi<·<· 'l'n<'kett and .JustieP HPnrio<l filing 
\nith•n <fo;sents. 
ln writing tlw initial majority opm10n, Justice 
Tuckett Pxpr<~ssly n'served appellant's Points II and III . 
• Judge Cowley, in the second majority opinion, dis-
posed of Point II with two paragraphs under reiteration 
of the erronPous citation of Chief Justice Crockett's con-
c11rri11g opinion in Jones v. Logan City, supra. 
Point III of aprwllant's appt>al is not disposed of 
nor refrrred to in 0itlit>r opinion otlH~r tltan .Judge 
'l'nekdt's resnvation thereof . 
. \IHiU~IKKT 
POINT I 
THE PETITION FOR REHEARING WAS PREMA-
TURELY GRANTED, WITHOUT OPPORTUNITY TO 
ANSWER SAID PETITION AS CONTEMPLATED BY 
76(e) (2), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
1953, THE PETITION HAVING BEEN GRANTED 
WHILE APPELLANT WAS COMPILING AN AN-
SWERING BRIEF AND WHILE APPELLANT STILL 
HAD 8 DAYS OF HER ANSWERING TIME RE-
MAINING, UNDER THE ABOVE RULE. 
As .Justice Callist<>r is not in tll(' <·tuw at tlw ]Jl'<'S<'nt 
time, ther<> is no way to ddermine ''Thether he would 
have assPnted to a rPlwaring, therehy making a majority 
had the appellant hPen allow<:>d the time to answer by 
Rn le 7G( <') (2), Ftah Rnles of CiYil Procedure 195:3. 
which d<ws not contemplate an ex parte hearing, and 
'/ 
had appt'lla11t\; counsel lw<:>11 afforded U1t> opportunity to 
present his sidv. 
lf the H'cords should show that .Justicl' Callister 
"disqualified himself" rather than heing absent at the 
time of rt'hearing, the question is posed: "Did he (being 
disqualified) have the capacity to join in the granting 
of th(~ rehearing?" 
If he did not, it would leave a two-two split of the 
Court \vith the prior decision of the Court bt-ing necessar-
ily affirmed. Set~ Cordllcr 1.:. Cordner, suvra, and also 
Wendelboe 1j. Jacouw11, et al., 10 Utah 2d 344, 353 P.2d 
] 78, where one judge concurring with the majority voted 
for rehearing, lem·ing a hrn-two split, Justice -Wade 
ha\·ing dis<1nalified himself prior to the original hearing. 
POINT II 
THE CITY'S PETITION AND/OR ITS BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT THEREOF FOR REHEARING SETS UP 
NO GROUND FOR REHEARING, MERELY ASKING 
THAT THE COURT RECONSIDER MATTERS CON-
SIDERED ON THE ORIGINAL HEARING. 
All three of the City's points on rehearing were 
merc>ly a re-hash of matters thoroughly considered by 
thP Court following the initial hearing and resulting 
in a Court divided three to two for reversal. The argu-
ments on rehearing did not result in a change of the 
opinion of any judge sitting on the rehearing, but in 
pffret constitute a hearing heforP a court ~with a ne\Y 
lll<'111lwr; and is not in accordance with the purpose of 
rdwarings, lrnt is a <·ulmination of the dangers pointed 
out in Cordn('r r. Cord11er, supra. See Dnchcneait i:. 
f/oitse, 4 lTtah 48:1, l1 P. G19: 
"Bowman .J. 11lw iwtition for rehearing states 
no new facts or grounds for reversal of the lower 
court. It is mainly a reargument of the casP. We 
have n•pl•atE>dly callE>d attention to thP fact that 
no rehearing will be granted whPr(• nothing new 
and important is offered for our consideration. 
\VP again say that we cannot grant a rel waring 
unless strong showing therefor be made. A re-
argnrnent, or argument with tlw court upon points 
of the decision with no new light giv<>n, is not 
sneh a showing." 
To tlw sarne effect Jones v. Howw and Hansackfr v. 
1Same, 4 Utah 484, 11 P. G19, and see C1tmmings v. Nelson, 
42 Utah 157, 129 P. G19, where at page 624 of the Pacific 
citation .Justice Frick discnsses rehearings. 
It is evident that the pnrpose of a rehE>aring is to 
convince the court or mernhers therE>of that it Nred or 
misconstrued tlw law or facts, and not to present the 
original iss1w or issnPs to a conrt composed of two 
of the orginal majority, hoth of the original dissenters, 
and with a fifth judgP :"eleet<'d hy the Chief .Justice, in 
this instan('e a rnernher of tliE> minority in the initial 
hearing. 
POINT III 
THE RECORD INDICATES THAT JUSTICE CALLIS-
TER DID NOT AFFIRMATIVELY DISQUALIFY 
Hll\ISELF, BUT WAS ANNOUNCED BY THE CHIEF 
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JUSTICE AS BEING "OUT OF STATE'' WHEN THE 
MATTER CAl\IE ON FOR REHEARI:'.'\G. 
S<'<' di:-;<·us:-;ior1 in Poi ni l. 
POINT IV 
THE MAJORITY OPINION DISPOSES OF THE CON-
STITUTION AL VAGUE NESS AND AMBIGUITY 
POINT WHICH WAS EXPRESSLY RESERVED BY 
THE ORIGINAL MAJORITY OPINION BY AT-
TEMPTING TO PRESERVE ONE PHRASE OF A 
SUBSECTION OF AN ORDINANCE WITH ONE CI-
TATION, "SEE CHIEF JUSTICE CROCKETT'S CON-
CURRING OPINION IN JONES V. LOGAN CITY, 19 
UT AH 2d 169, 428 P.2d 160." 
THAT OPINION IS A DISSENT AND IT IS EX-
PRESSLY AGAINST THE MAJORITY OF THE 
COURT, NOTWITHSTANDING JUSTICE CROCK-
ETT'S USE OF THE SAME CITATION IN HIS DIS-
SENT IN THE OPINION ON THE FIRST HEARING 
OF THE CASE WHERE IT WAS ALSO REFERRED 
TO AS A CONCURRING OPINION. 
r1 1Jip rnajorit~· opinion on n•hparing s1wnds the last 
two parngravht-i on thP amwllant's Point II r<:>garding 
vagne1wss and arnbignity attempting to solve the problem 
h.Y ignoring all hut one phrasP of subsection 7 of the 
ordinancP, to wit, sexnal intPrcourse for hire: 
"(7) Direct or offer to dirPd an_,. pert-1on to any 
place or building for the }HU})OS<:> of committing 
anv lewd act or act of Rexnal intN<·o1n-s<' for hire 
or ·of moral pervPrRion." 
'11hit-i i:-; not thP law with r<'gard to Hewrnhi lity. rl'nw, 
in onlinan('Pl-:' having· sPveral :-;nb:,;edions, it hat-; at times 
l><·Pn lH'ld tliat onP snhsPdion may fail and tlw rPmaining 
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~nhH·<·tions of an onlinarn·(• n•1tiain valid, dqwmling on 
tlw inknt of tlw lq.~ii-dativP body 0nacting thf' statute 
01 onlinanC'<'. H<nn•n•r, tlw writPr finds no precedt>nt for 
snhdi,·iding or s<•gr<'gating a suhs<·ction of an ordinance, 
liolcli11g 01w word or plirmw valid and the rPst invalid. 
This <l<ws not stand the test of severability. See McQitil-
1i11 J/1111ici1)(/l Corvorotions, 3rd Ed., Yol. G, page 155, 
et s<'q. ThP ea:s<' cit<•d as authority for th<' majority's 
ltolding on tlw ambiguity point ignores snch easPs as 
fitate r. Jll/.'iSi'r, us Utah 537, 223 P.2d rn3, and the 
Fnifrd Statl's Supre1rn• Court case of the samt> name 
whieh eom1wllt•d tlw dPcision, and cites only a dissenting 
opinion refprred to as a concnrring opinion which does 
not disC'nss severability in any way and is a dissent from 
tlH· majority opinion of this Court. 
To illustrate the vagueness, ambiguity, and total 
incongruity of the ordinance in question, consider the 
following: Appellant was charged with a violation of 
:32-2-l in that she directed a police officer to the B0n 
Allwrt Aparb1wnts for pnrposPs of sexual intercourse. 
ln J"PS1Jonse to a demand for hill of particulars asking 
the follo\\·ing questions, tlw City gave the following 
answers: 
Q. Fnd<'r what s<•dion or sections of 32-2-1, Re-
vised Ordinances of Sa1t Lake Cit:' 1959, \ms 
the defendant charged? 
A. Dd'endant wm; charged under section (8) of 
32-2-l Rc•,·is0d Ordinanc<'s of Salt Lak<> City 
19(15. 
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Q. \Vho, if anyonP, offt'l"Pd ::::exual intncourse 
for hire to a Salt Lake City pol ic:Prnan ~ 
A. Sexual interc:ourse for hire wa1:; offered a 
Salt Lake City Policeman b\· Pe<wv LoveJ.OY 
• bb. • ' 
also known as Peggy Allred, and by Angie 
Cologne, also known as Angie Paposakis. 
Q. Who was the person purportedly din•cted to 
Apartment 506 at the BPn Allwrt hy the 
defendant? 
A. Salt Lake City Police Officer Stan .Jorgenson 
was the person directed to the B<•n Albert 
Apartment by Peggy Lovejo>·, also known as 
Peggy Allred, Defendant. 
It would appear from the plt•adings that Mrs. Allred 
may possibly have been guilty of subsection (2) of the 
ordinance or subsection (7) of the ordinance, or possibly 
subsection (1) of the ordinance for offering sexual inter-
course for hire (though she did not offer to commit an 
act of sexual intercounw for hirP), but in any one of 
those subst>ctions she would have been the principal and 
not an aider or alwttPr. It is hasic that onP cannot aid 
or abet thernst>lves. 
T'he ambiguity of the ordinanc:e as a ·wholP is such 
that tht> City misunderstood the ordinance in making the 
charge, and the Supreme Court in the majority opinion 
on rehearing construed the charge in its discussion of 
muhiguit>· as charging Pt>g-p;y Allred with aiding or abet-
ting in the crimt> set forth in suhsection (7) of directing 
or offering to direct any person to any place or building 
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for th(' purpos<' ot' nmunitting an:- !Pwd act or ad ol' 
H'Xnal int<'l'<'Olll"S<' for hin· or of moral pPrY<'rsion. 
lt will lw noted that in tlH• final paragraph the Court 
diseusses th<> ambiguity of phrases in snbs<>ction (7), 
when both hy the complaint and hill of particulars the 
('harg-r• was brought nnd<•r subsection (8). 
POINT V 
THE REHEARING OF THIS CASE WITH A NEW 
DISTRICT JUDGE REPLACING ONE OF THE ORIG-
IN AL HEARERS, WITHOUT NOTICE OF ANY KIND 
TO COUNSEL, WAS AGAINST THE SPIRIT AND 
IMPORT OF REHEARINGS AND THE GREAT MA-
JORITY OF LAW WITH RESPECT THERETO, SEE 
CORDNER v. CORDNER, 91 Utah 474, 64 P.2d 828, 
AND CASES CITED THEREIN. 
rnw relwaring of the easP ,,-ith a new judge sitting 
to replaC'P om• of the form<T majority judg<>s, without 
uotic<> to counsel, is not cont<>mplat<>d h:- the law regard-
ing r<>h<>arings, hnt if' as stah•d hy this Court in Cordner 
-r. Cordner, supra: 
wrhe eff<:>ct of t}H• participation of a n<>W lllellilWl' 
of the conrt, \dwre thP conrt is Pvenly diYidPd on 
t1w CJllPstion aftpr the retireuwnt of tlw fornwr 
member, would estahlish a precedent fraught "-itli 
dangerons implications." 
Also, it is statPd in RI' Tlwmpso11's f,'state, 27 Utah 
17, 2(i~) P. 108: 
"'l11wn~, one of fop jnstic<'s of this eourt was in-
caparitat<>d hy illn<>ss and a distrid judge was 
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called in to sit in his stead. The decision was 
rendered by a divided court, tlw distrirt judge 
voting with tht> majority. Bt>fore tlH· petition for 
rehearing ~was lll'ard, the incapacitatvd justice had 
died and the vacancy filled by appoi11hw•nt. Three 
of tht• four jnstices ht>ld, without the <listrid judge 
participating, that the diHtrict judge was (•11titled 
to sit with the other members of tht> court, exclud-
ing the newly appointed justice, to <ld<·nni11<· the 
matter of rehearing. On merits, tlw }H'tition for 
rehearing was denied by the sauw votP of thrP<> to 
two as in the original decision. The pffrct of that 
decision was the exclusion of the n<>wly appoint<>d 
justice from passing on the petition for n'lH•aring, 
notwithstanding he was at the time a qnalifiPd 
member of this conrt." 
Tlw <·ase of lVoodlntry r. Dorman, 15 ~[inn. :~41 (Gil 
~74), is also cited with approval in the Thompson case, 
~mpra, tl1P eourt tlwn~ stating: 
wn1e majority of this court as it was constituted 
at the time of the original hearing, and decision 
of this case, after much discussion and delilwra-
tion, came to conclusions (myself disst>nting) 
~which led to the affirmance of the judgment. Since 
the decision was filed, the author of the majority 
opinion has been succeeded by the prese>nt chief 
justice>. Were the court not constituted as it was 
when the decision was rendered, then" is not thP 
slighte>st reason to suppose that the decision wonld 
he changed. So that if a re-argument were now 
allowed, and the former decision reversed, this 
rt>sult would follow, not from a eonYietion upon 
the part of the members of the court h~· which 
tlH' east> was originall;.· lward and detennint>d, that 
' . . ' 
tlw de('.ision was e1Torn·ous, 110r from tlw <·011-
si<kration of reasons and arguments not lwfon· 
advam·ed and considerrd, hut solPly from th<· 
change in tlw composition of th(' court. Fnd<'r 
such circmnstances, a relaxation of the ordinan-
ru]('s governing applications for n•-argm11ent, 
wonld se0m to hP pecnliarl:- ill-tinwd. It \rnuld, 
in our opinion, ht> a violation of properties in th<' 
administration of justice, which it is the dnt:- of 
a court to maintain, and would tend to destroy that 
n•spect for, and confidence in judicial trihnnab, 
the loss of which PY<'n- good citizen would d<'-
plore." 
POINT VI 
APPELLANT'S POINT III REMAINS ENTIRELY 
UNDISPOSED OF AND UNDISCUSSED. 
Judge Tuekett in the m'xt to last paraµ;raph of tlw 
first rnajorit:- O}linion states: 
"In view of onr dc->cision ahoYe, it is unnecessary 
to discuss tlw othrr contentions of appellant." 
ThP rnajorit,Y opinion m~itlit•r discusses, disposes of. 
nor mentions appellant's Point III. 
POINT VII 
THE MATTER, IF REHEARD, SHOULD HA VE 
BEEN REHEARD BY THE SAME COURT OR SUCH 
PORTION THEREOF AS WAS STILL SITTING AND 
NOT DISQUALIFIED. 
Nmd1<•rp in onr law nor m the n·<·ords of the Su-
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pn'lllP Court can the ·writer find a criterion for selecting 
a District Judge to sit on the Supreme Court Bench to 
replaee a .Justice who is deceased, absent, or disqualified, 
as the case may be. 
It would appear that the practice has been for the 
Chief Justice or, in his absence, the acting Chief Justice 
to call in a District Judge when nrcessary, whether that 
.Judge is selected by lot, by following an alphabetical 
or chronological list, by availability, or by choice of the 
assigning Justice does not appear by rule in general nor 
by minute entry in the instant case. 
It seems manifastly unjust when• one of the original 
Justices concurring in a majority opinion for any reason 
does not sit on a rehe'aring to allow one of the former 
dissenters or, for that matter, one of the former Justices 
siding with the majority opinion, to select a new judge 
to break the apparent deadlock. 
In the spirit and rationale of the procedural rules, 
the cases on rehearing, and in the interest of justice, the 
matter should have (a) been heard by the remainder of 
the original Court, (b) been continued pending the return 
of the absent Justice. 
SU~E\TAHY 
Wherefore, appellant respectfully requests this 
eonrt to eonsider this petition for rehearing and, in view 
16 
of the poinb herein, to set aside ih; opinion filed Febrn-
ary 9, 19GS, and reinstate the opinion of July 17, 19G7. 
RespectfuU~, submitted, 
HATCH & McRAE 
